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In 2011, President Barack Obama announced that the United States was going to pivot 
toward the Asia-Pacific. There is widespread scholarly discussion as to whether this shift 
to the Asia-Pacific was motivated primarily by regional security anxieties or by larger 
economic and diplomatic interests. Through the analysis of China’s military growth and 
threatening behavior within the Asia-Pacific region, and the examination of various 
economic reasons to strategically shift to the Pacific, this thesis attempts to answer the 
question: Why did the United States decide in 2011 to adopt this rebalancing strategy and 
increase its military and economic resources to the Asia-Pacific region? 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In 2011, the Obama administration delivered a series of declarations that signaled 
to the public and global leaders that the United States would be shifting its focus to the 
Asia-Pacific.1 These statements announced a policy shift that was encouraged by four 
key changes. These developments include the growing economic importance of the Asia-
Pacific, China’s growing military capabilities and its increasing forcefulness within the 
Pacific region, the drawdown of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 
ongoing efforts to cut the U.S. federal budget.2 The question this thesis will ask is why 
did the United States decide in 2011 to increase the diplomatic, military, and economic 
resources it devotes to the Asia-Pacific region? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
First, there is a debate about whether the rebalance is driven mainly by military 
concerns or by broader economic and diplomatic interests, and consequently, there is a 
debate about the relative weight of military and non-military concerns in shaping the 
implementation this policy shift. Thus, it is important to examine the origins of this 
policy in order to determine what actually caused it. 
Second, the conditions under which the policy was announced have changed so 
the policy itself may be changing or even be unsustainable. In particular, the policy is 
closely associated with two former members of the Obama administration, Hillary 
Clinton and Robert Gates, and some analysts question whether their successors will 
support the policy as strongly. Similarly, the U.S. fiscal situation has worsened since the 
policy was announced in 2011, and this has led many observers to question the U.S. 
commitment to implementing the policy shift. 
                                                 
1 Mark E. Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward 
Asia (CRS Report No. R42448) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 28, 2012), 1–2, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf. 
2 Ibid., 2. 
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Third, the U.S. effort to influence the Asia-Pacific will potentially shape the entire 
international arena. The importance of knowing the answer to my research question is to 
understand why the United States decided to shift its policy toward the Pacific. 
Additionally, I think it is critical to examine and answer my research question because 
this shift in policy could have broad international effects. Furthermore, understanding the 
roots, intentions, and the transformation of the rebalancing policy can possibly help the 
United States form more regional alliances and build more regional partnerships. 
Arguably, the strength and commitment from the United States toward this rebalance 
policy will also help in strategically assuring the existing allies and partners against an 
assertive Chinese power. Additionally, this strategic assurance will potentially help the 
United States build new regional partnerships. In contrast to forming alliances and 
partners, this shift in policy can also possibly encourage a rising China to react negatively 
toward the United States. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
In general, analysts of U.S. foreign policy offer two different explanations for the 
Obama administration’s decision in 2011 to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. 
The first explanation is mainly economic, which is primarily focused on protecting U.S. 
economic interests in the Pacific, and taking advantage of the region’s economic growth, 
in order to help restore the economy in the United States. The second explanation 
underscores American military and defense interests in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The first hypothesis for rebalancing to the Pacific is to protect national economic 
interests in the Pacific, and to take advantage of the rapid economic growth in the Asia-
Pacific region. Because of this region’s fast economic growth, and its wide opportunities 
for investments, the U.S. decided to shift its focus to the Pacific, which in turn, will help 
to the United States’ economic recovery. Why not shift toward Europe? In contrast to the 
Asia-Pacific’s economic growth, Europe’s economic growth has been slow, and its banks 
currently face a series of liquidity problems.3 Additionally, Europe faces a sovereign debt 
                                                 
3 Jay C. Shambaugh, Ricardo Reis, and Hélène Rey, “The Euro’s Three Crises,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity (Spring 2012), 157, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23287217. 
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crisis.4 The United States seeks to achieve its Pacific rebalancing goal by strengthening 
relations with American allies and regional partners through regional bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations. The focus and ongoing negotiations in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) will help the United States to shape the economic architecture of the 
Asia-Pacific region by coordinating existing agreements with regional partners, and by 
attracting new TPP participants.5 In sum, one plausible hypothesis is that the United 
States decided to rebalance to the Pacific simply to protect and promote its economic 
interests within the Pacific region. 
The second hypothesis about the U.S. decision to shift its focus toward the Pacific 
emphasizes security concerns. Observers who favor this hypothesis argue that the United 
States was forced to focus on the Pacific in order to deter and contain a rising and 
assertive China. In contrast to the first hypothesis, which is largely an economic interest 
perspective, this hypothesis is mainly military in nature. China’s forceful and 
unpredictable behavior has led to an unstable and insecure Pacific region. China’s 
growing economy, increased defense expenditures, and enhanced military capabilities 
have arguably stimulated its aggressive and hostile behavior in regard to territorial 
disagreements in the South and East China Seas.6 In order to achieve this rebalancing 
strategy to deter a rising China, the United States will enhance its military presence in the 
region by repositioning some forces, increasing the number of troops and assets deployed 
to the region, and increasing the level of its military activities in the region.7 
In sum, after reviewing the two leading explanations on the rebalance to the 
Pacific, I tend to favor a combination of the two explanations to justify this shift of policy 
to the Asia-Pacific. Although there are diplomatic efforts within the region, the rebalance 
toward the Asia-Pacific is primarily intended to strategically reassure U.S. allies and 
                                                 
4 Shambaugh, Reis, and Rey, “Euro’s Three Crises,” 157. 
5 Ian F. Fergusson, et al., The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress 
(CRS Report No. R42694) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 13, 2013), 4, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42694.pdf. 
6 Ely Ratner, “Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China,” The Washington Quarterly 36 no. 2, 
(Spring 2013), 22–23, https://csis.org/files/publication/TWQ_13Spring_Ratner.pdf. 
7 Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? 1.  
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partners in the region, and secondarily a way to promote U.S. economic interests through 
trade and investment with dynamic Asia-Pacific countries. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review will provide a summary of key articles and reports on the 
reasons the United States decided to rebalance its resources toward the Pacific. I will 
organize this section around the two different schools of thought that have given rise to 
my two hypotheses. 
The first school of thought that explains my first hypothesis assumes that the 
motive behind the shifting policy toward the Pacific is to protect and to promote U.S. 
economic interests within the region. The very first statement of the United States’ new 
policy toward the Pacific was captured in Hillary Clinton’s article in Foreign Policy, 
which highlighted the United States’ vision on foreign policy and the U.S. desire to 
protect its economic interests abroad.8 Clinton’s statement emphasized that the United 
States’ economic recovery heavily depended on exporting to the Pacific, and the ability 
for American businesses to tap into the growing consumer market in Asia.9 The United 
States continues to increase its engagement economically, diplomatically, and politically 
within the region over the next decade, by strengthening its regional relationships. 
Furthermore, the creation of partnerships within the region will help the United States in 
promoting and protecting its national interests within the Pacific region. Furthermore, the 
main elements that will contribute in the effective shift to the Pacific are solidifying 
regional working relationships, deepening engagements with regional multilateral 
institutions, expanding trade and investment, and improving regional democratic and 
human rights.10 In Secretary Clinton’s article, she expressed that despite the uncertainties 
and confusions about China being a rising threat to American power within the region, 
cooperation is economically healthier for both countries than confrontation.11 
                                                 
8 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century. 
9 Ibid., 3. 
10 Ibid., 4. 
11 Ibid., 7. 
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The United States has been attracted to the Asia-Pacific region’s economic 
potential for a variety of reasons. In particular, it has been the largest source of imports to 
the United States and the second-largest market for U.S. exports since 2000.12 In 
addition, the Asia-Pacific region has a large and growing impact on the on the 
international economy as a whole.13 
The strategic shift to Asia involves a variety of elements, which are all equally 
critical for a successful execution of the rebalance strategy to Pacific. Furthermore, these 
elements include strengthening political and economic relations within the region. 
Although there are a variety of aspects within this strategy, it is especially important for 
the United States to deepen its political and economic relationship with the Association 
of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). The relationship with ASEAN will ultimately 
benefit the United States, because it will help in promoting and protecting the U.S. 
economic interests within the Pacific region.14 The Trans-Pacific Partnership is 
considered the centerpiece that will help solidify and validate the rebalance strategy in 
the Pacific.15 It is important for the United States to finalize its efforts with the TPP, 
since its finalization will help expand U.S. economic growth, jobs, and ultimately benefit 
the economy of the United States.16 
According to this hypothesis, the rebalancing strategy does not represent a 
containment approach toward China, since the United States does not gain economically 
if China is contained.17 The United States has pursued a cooperative policy, which helps 
integrate China’s growing power, into the economic international system. This 
cooperative policy will benefit both countries, since it will enhance the region’s stability 
                                                 
12 Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? 6. 
13 Ibid., 7. 
14 Ibid., 13. 
15 Scott Miller and Matthew P. Goodman, “TPP Trade Ministers Get Close, but No Deal in 
Singapore,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 10, 2013, https://csis.org/ 
publication/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-ministers-meeting; Fergusson, et al., Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
2. 
16 Fergusson, et al., Trans-Pacific Partnership, 2. 
17 Robert A. Manning, “US Counterbalancing China, Not Containing,” East Asia Forum, July 9, 2013, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/09/us-counterbalancing-china-not-containing/. 
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and economic interdependence, and therefore help increase the economic growth for both 
countries. Moreover, a cooperative relationship between Washington and Beijing will 
strengthen and improve the Asia-Pacific economic environment; therefore, making it 
mutually beneficial for both countries. Despite many competing arguments, China and 
the United States will both economically gain from this rebalancing strategy to the 
Pacific. The economic, political, and diplomatic aspects, and government engagements 
within the region are all critical components that will ultimately contribute to the 
protection of U.S. economic interests within the Pacific region. 
According to experts who advocate this explanation, the United States is actively 
seeking to increase its diplomatic, political, and economic resources toward Asia, in order 
to protect its national economic interests in the region.18 Although China has developed 
economically and expanded its military capabilities, a confrontation between these two 
countries will likely damage the mutually beneficial relationship that exists between the 
United States and China. Furthermore, a cooperative U.S.-China relationship will only 
expand their regional and global economic interests.19 
Ely Ratner puts forth an additional piece of literature in which he asks whether the 
rebalance strategy will survive Hillary Clinton’s departure from the State Department?20 
In this article, he highlights that this key positional change created some doubts 
throughout the region although there are key regional supporters of the rebalance. 
Furthermore, this literature piece lays out some key recommendations, which will help 
lessen some regional concerns about Secretary of State, John Kerry’s commitment. 
Moreover, some recommendations include the nomination of a strong and aggressive 
assistant secretary, and demonstrating his support through more regional visits and 
diplomatic interactions.21. 
                                                 
18 Phillip C. Saunders, “The U.S. Isn’t Trying to Contain China,” Foreign Policy, August 23, 2003. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/23/the_united_states_is_not_trying_to_contain_china. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ely Ratner, “Secretary Kerry and the Future of the U.S. Rebalancing to Asia,” China-US Focus, 
March 23, 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/print/?id=25501. 
21 Ibid. 
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The second school of thought that explains my second hypothesis assumes that 
the motive behind the shifting policy toward the Pacific is to deter and contain an 
emerging and hostile China. The Asia-Pacific region has been developing into a highly 
challenging region, which holds threatening state actors such as North Korea and China 
that, in turn, threaten the peace and stability of the entire region.22 Furthermore, in 
response to these regional threats, the United States must increase its focus and 
importance to its security forces in the Pacific in order to strengthen the Pacific’s security 
environment and deter China.23 For example, Thomas Fargo mainly emphasizes the 
security elements of the shift in policy, which includes the increase of the military 
presence and the repositioning of U.S. military forces in the Pacific region. The strategic 
steps that the U.S. has taken, which are primarily military in nature, help support the 
containment strategy argument. The following are some military steps that the U.S. has 
proposed: deploying 2,500 Marines to northern Australia, strengthening the U.S. defense 
alliance with the Philippines, and solidifying cooperative and military ties with South 
Korea, Japan, and Vietnam.24 
The connections that were made under Obama’s first term in office were founded 
on a strategic reassurance concept that was intended to provide assurance to U.S. allies 
against an assertive Chinese power.25 Furthermore, this strategic reassurance concept was 
transformed into the “Pivot to Asia,” and later into the current rebalancing strategy.26 
This shift in focus is widely suggested that this rebalance is nothing more than a 
containment strategy against China simply because this change of policy has been 
primarily military in nature, since it heavily involves the re-posturing of U.S. forces 
throughout the Asia-Pacific.27 
                                                 
22 Thomas Fargo, “The Military Side of Strategic Rebalancing,” Asia Policy, no. 14, (July 2012), 26, 
http://muse.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/journals/asia_policy/v014/14.fargo.html. 
23 Ibid., 26–27. 
24 Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? 10–12. 
25 Sabrina Tsai, Obama’s Second Term in the Asia-Pacific Region: Reflecting on the Past, Looking to 
the Future (N.p.: Project 2049 Insitute, September 2013), 17. 
26 Ibid., 7–11. 
27 Ibid., 17. 
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According to analysts who favor this explanation of the rebalance, the United 
States’ leadership needs to be strengthened in order to define acceptable behavior for 
China and strengthen deterrence within the region.28 For them, the rebalance strategy is a 
strategic approach that requires an increase of U.S. military capabilities in the interest of 
deterring an assertive China. Additionally, a significant persuading factor to shift its 
focus and policy toward Asia is China’s growing anti-access/area-denial capabilities and 
their increase in power projection abilities, which are products of their economic growth. 
Furthermore, the creation of the Air-Sea Battle office in 2011, around the same time as 
former Secretary Clinton’s announcement to “Pivot to Asia,” only augmented the 
assumption that this shift of focus is to deter and contain China.29 Policy analysts view 
the strengthening of security relationships of countries such as, Japan, South Korea, and 
the Philippines as a method to start staging a containment strategy against China.30 
In a speech that he delivered to an audience of Pacific leaders in 2013, Secretary 
Chuck Hagel stressed the United States’ continued commitment to the Pacific and to 
Obama’s rebalancing strategy.31 He said that the strategic shift of U.S. policy toward the 
Asia-Pacific region is simply a strategy that is aimed at shaping behavior throughout the 
region.32 Although Secretary Hagel is faced with many challenges, which include the 
shift of weight from the Middle East to Asia, he remains focused toward the rebalancing 
to the Pacific. This shift of U.S. policy encompasses a mixture of economic, social, 
cultural, diplomatic, and military elements.33 Additionally, Hagel’s declaratory 
commitments toward the rebalance strategy demonstrates that even if tensions emerge in 
                                                 
28 James M. Keagle, Richard D. Fisher, Jr., and Brian Johnson, “Enhancing the U.S. Rebalance 
Toward Asia: Enhancing Allies,” Joint Force Quarterly 70, (2013), 59, http://www.strategycenter.net/ 
docLib/20130709_JFQ70_KeagleFisherJohnson.pdf. 
29 Ibid., 60–61. 
30 Tsai, Obama’s Second Term, 17. 
31 Karen Parrish, “U.S. Following Through on Pacific Rebalance, Hagel Says,” U.S. Department of 
Defense, June 1, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120186. 
32 Ibid. 




other parts of the world the United States will continue to pledge its commitment toward 
the Pacific.34 
In sum, it appears that the United States wants to simply shift its policy in order to 
strategically assure its regional allies and partners and to protect its economic interests. 
My preliminary conclusion is that although there are diplomatic efforts within the Pacific 
region, the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific is primarily a way to strategically reassure 
U.S. allies, partners within the region, and protect U.S. economic interests in the interest 
of strengthening the domestic economic growth. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will assess the rebalancing’s beginnings and evolution. Additionally, 
this thesis will also study the military and economic aspects of the proposed rebalancing 
strategy to the Pacific mainly from a historical and comparative approach. I will extract 
this thesis’s supporting information primarily from secondary sources. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
To summarize, the first chapter of my thesis will introduce and provide the 
analytical framework that will describe the proposed rebalance to the Pacific. The next 
chapter will examine the security reasons for the rebalance strategy. Furthermore, in this 
chapter, I will address my first hypothesis that explains that the rebalance to the Pacific is 
a strategy to contain China. I will also examine China’s increased military capabilities 
and assertive regional behavior that may have caused the United States to shift its policy. 
The next chapter of my thesis will examine the economic reasons for the rebalancing 
strategy. This chapter will address my second hypothesis that explains that the shift to the 
Pacific is mainly a strategy to promote and protect U.S. economic interests in the Asia-
Pacific region. The last chapter of my thesis will be my concluding chapter. In my 
concluding chapter, I will synthesize and stress the importance of my thesis. 
  
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
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II. MILITARY/SECURITY REASONS FOR THE REBALANCE 
TO THE PACIFIC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the words of former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, “The ultimate 
goal of the rebalance policy is to promote U.S. interests by helping to shape the norms 
and rules of the Asia-Pacific region, to ensure that international laws and norms be 
respected, that commerce and freedom of navigation are not impeded, that emerging 
powers build trust with their neighbors and that disagreements are resolved peacefully 
without threats or coercion.”35 China’s increase in defense spending, military buildup and 
lack of transparency has created several concerns about its strategic intentions. Although 
Beijing states that its rise is peaceful, I will argue in this chapter that China’s growth in 
military capabilities and threatening behavior motivated the United States to adopt the 
rebalancing strategy toward the Asia-Pacific in order to reassure its allies and partners 
within the region. The first section of this chapter will assess China’s growth in military 
capabilities, which will entail examining their defense budget, overall military strategy, 
and military developments. In the next section in this chapter, I will study and evaluate 
China’s assertive behavior throughout the region. This section will examine various cases 
of Chinese assertiveness, before and after the introduction of the rebalance policy in 
2011. After examining China’s military growth and assertiveness, I will then demonstrate 
that the policymakers who shaped the rebalance policy did so in response to China’s 
increased military capabilities and growing assertiveness throughout the Asia-Pacific 
region, by analyzing the U.S. military responses. 
B. CHINA’S MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
China’s large military buildup has created a considerable amount of concern in 
Asia, and has triggered a shift of American foreign policy toward Asia. Over the past 
decade, Asia’s dragon has been gradually strengthening and modernizing its military. 
                                                 
35 Tom Donilon, “America is Back in the Pacific and will Uphold the Rules,” Financial Times, 
November 27, 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4f3febac-1761-11e1-b00e 00144feabdc0.html 
#axzz3BdMlj5fJ. 
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According to several leading scholars, it is argued that the U.S. rebalance strategy is a 
direct response toward this growing menacing Chinese behavior, which I will later 
explain in this chapter.36 
1. OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S DEFENSE BUDGET 
China has the fastest growing global economy, which in turn helps support its fast 
growing military budget.37 China’s military spending, which has seen double digit 
increases almost every year for the past two decades, has created a significant amount of 
concern regarding its intentions.38 A troubling development that has been taking place 
since 2010 is that China’s military spending has been becoming detached from its overall 
GDP growth.39 Although China’s economic growth has slowed its defense budget has 
continued to increase. According to the research carried out by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Beijing has been swiftly increasing and 
upgrading its military forces, which involves an increase in their annual defense spending 
from over $20 billion in 2000 to almost $120 billion in 2010.40 The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that China’s military expenditure in 2010 surpassed 
the military spending of U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany.41 
What are the dragon’s new teeth? Beijing’s lack of transparency in their published 
defense budget, which did not include expenses of their strategic forces, foreign 
purchases, and military related research and development, only created a considerable 
                                                 
36 Yoichi Kato, “Interview / Kurt Campbell: China Should Accept U.S. Enduring Leadership Role in 
Asia,” The Asahi Shimbun, February 9, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/opinion/AJ201302090016; 
Robert S. Ross, “US Grand Strategy, the Rise of China, and US National Security Strategy for East Asia,” 
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amount of concern throughout the region.42 In general, China’s military expenditures 
cover personnel expenses, costs for construction and maintenance of military assets, 
military training, research and experimentation, and logistical support.43 Why has China 
increased its military spending? In the next part of this thesis, I will examine Beijing’s 
ambition of a larger strategy. 
2. CHINA’S LARGER STRATEGY 
China’s growth in defense spending reflects a shift in their military strategy. After 
Operation DESERT STORM, Chinese analysts carefully assessed the various elements 
that contributed to the success of the United States and concluded that in the event of an 
armed conflict with the United States, it would be crucial to disrupt or defuse the U.S. 
military deployment process. According to scholars and defense officials, it is believed 
that China’s impressively growing military is linked with a larger anti-access/area denial 
(A2/AD) strategy that is intended to disrupt U.S. power projection in the Pacific in the 
event of conflict.44 The A2/AD strategy aims to restrict and deny an adversary’s ability to 
move freely on the battlefield. Motivated by an assessment of the results of OPERATION 
DESERT STORM, China adopted A2/AD strategies and ideas in order to counter the 
United States in the event of a conflict.45 Chinese A2/AD includes the use of ballistic and 
cruise missiles, which threaten the U.S. air and naval bases in Okinawa and Guam 
because of their long-range capability.46 According to a study from the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, another A2/AD tactic that may be carried out to 
defeat U.S. forces is to conduct a series of large-scale preemptive attacks on airfields, 
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aircraft carriers, surface combatant vessels.47 These preemptive attacks would be 
intended to destroy U.S. and allied forces in the Pacific region. Chinese A2/AD maritime 
capabilities may pose a significant threat to U.S. forces within the Pacific region in the 
future since modern Chinese warships contain a range of anti-ballistic and cruise 
missiles, which can potentially affect a U.S. Carrier Strike Group’s (CSG) level of 
effectiveness in the Western Pacific.48 In addition to these large preemptive attacks, 
China’s submarine force also presents a significant threat to U.S. forces in the Pacific 
region because these undersea units can possibly deny the access of U.S. surface 
combatants to nearby bases.49 Furthermore, China’s adoption of these A2/AD tactics 
presents a problem for the United States since these enhanced military capabilities will 
endanger U.S. assets in the Pacific from afar.50 In addition to its A2/AD strategy, China 
has also adopted a calculated approach to their territorial disputes over the past decade. 
According to defense analysts, China’s method for behaving assertively within the region 
and particularly towards its territorial disputes is characterized as a salami-slicing 
strategy.51 Moreover, this salami-slicing strategy involves gradually consolidating control 
over disputed islands throughout the region.52 
In the following subsections in this thesis, I am going to examine the 
modernization of China’s naval, artillery, air force and space forces in order to illustrate 
the growth in its defense capabilities. The following subsections are going to focus on 
China’s military growth between 2001 and 2011. Moreover, these capabilities will be 
organized according to their level of significance for China’s A2/AD strategy. 
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3. THE PLA NAVY 
Over the past decade, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been given 
a considerable amount of priority over the other military services, which is why I chose to 
start analyzing the PLAN first.53 The PLAN is primarily responsible for upholding 
China’s maritime security and preserving its autonomy over claimed territorial seas.54 
Since 2000, the PLAN has made significant progress in expanding and improving its 
fleet.55 Moreover, over the last decade the PLAN has enhanced its blue-water naval 
capabilities by adding guided missile frigates (FFG), guided missile destroyers (DDG), 
and submarines to its fleet.56 The PLAN’s assets have expanded from small coastal 
defense navy to a blue-water power projection naval force.57 These enlargements over the 
last decade include, 79 surface combatants, over 55 submarines, 55 amphibious ships, 
and approximately 85 missile equipped small combatants.58 The PLAN’s assets include, 
79 surface combatants, over 55 submarines, 55 amphibious ships, and approximately 85 
missile equipped small combatants.59 Furthermore, the PLAN is primarily responsible for 
upholding China’s maritime security and preserving its autonomy over claimed territorial 
seas. Since 2008, the PLA Navy has engaged in a robust surface shipbuilding program.60 
China has also increased its naval capabilities in the littoral and amphibious 
warfare areas. PLA Navy’s JIANGDAO-class corvettes (FFL) are a new class of ships 
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that are designed to carry out its maritime operations in littoral waters.61 China plans to 
build 20–30 new FFLs in order to augment its littoral capability.62 These FFLs are 
characterized as swift and maneuverable missile patrol boats that will be strategically 
based throughout the East and South China Sea.63 In addition to these new developments 
in the littoral warfare area, China has also been increasing its amphibious military 
capability by adding two amphibious transport dock (LPD) ships to its fleet.64 
The PLA Navy also places a considerable amount of importance on the 
improvements of its undersea assets. China has always considered the submarine as a key 
strategic piece of regional deterrence.65 Over the past decade, the PLA Navy has greatly 
expanded its undersea force. Since the 1990s, China has purchased 12 Russian 
manufactured Kilo-class-non-nuclear powered attack submarines.66 In addition, China 
has integrated 40 submarines into its fleet, which were also acquired from Russia.67 
Moreover, China’s growing submarine force includes the manufacture of their JIN-class 
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and its nuclear-powered attack 
submarines.68 
In addition to the PLAN’s increase of naval forces and capabilities, China’s navy 
has also made significant headway in technological improvement to its fleet.69 For 
example, China’s DDG’s have become equipped over the last decade with vertical launch 
systems and Chinese Aegis systems that makes their air-defense more effective.70 
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4. THE PLA SECOND ARTILLERY FORCE 
A second important sub-organization within China’s armed forces, which has 
made significant improvements in their defense capabilities, is the PLA Second Artillery 
Force (PLASAF). The PLASAF is the central force for China’s strategic deterrence.71 
The PLASAF is primarily responsible for the nuclear and conventional missile forces and 
responsible for deterring other state actors from using nuclear weapons against China.72 
Over the past decade the PLASAF has been modernizing older missile systems in 
the interest of amplifying their arsenal.73 By 2007, the PLASAF had developed 990 to 
1070 short-range ballistic missiles.74 Furthermore, in 2009 the PLASAF had produced 
1050 to 1150 short-range ballistic missiles.75 In 2008, the PLASAF possessed small 
quantities of new solid-fuel, road-mobile, and intercontinental missiles, and by 2010 the 
PLASAF already possessed 20-25 of these intercontinental missiles.76 Additionally, in 
2008 PLASAF deployed 50-250 of their new land attack cruise missiles, and by 2010 the 
PLASAF had deployed 200-500 of these land attack cruise missiles.77 Furthermore, 
China’s ability to defend against cruise missiles was limited in 2000, but in January 2010 
China conducted its first successful test of a missile defense system.78 This upgrade in 
China’s silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles is another significant modernized 
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military capability.79 In 2007, China had been improving its longer-range ballistic 
arsenal, which included variants that possessed the capability of anti-access missions.80 
By 2011, China already acquired large quantities of longer-range missiles and started 
developing anti-ship ballistic missiles that provided China’s forces to carry out attacks on 
large ships in the western Pacific.81 These significant developments over the past decade 
in China’s missile arsenal illustrate China’s gradual growth in their military capabilities. 
After examining these pieces of evidence regarding China’s missile developments one 
can conclude that PLASAF has been steadily expanding its missile arsenal and 
strengthening its military defenses since 2000. 
5. THE PLA AIR FORCE 
A third sub-organization within China’s military is the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), 
which has also made some significant developments to its military capabilities. The 
PLAAF is China’s primary component to carry out its air operations.82 In addition, the 
PLAAF is mainly responsible for maintaining China’s territorial air security and keeping 
a solid territorial air defense stance.83 Over the past decade, the PLAAF has made a series 
of transitions and upgrades to their arsenal.84 In 2000, the PLAAF possessed 1,000 
bombers and close-air support aircraft;  these were technologically obsolete, but by the 
time the United States adopted its rebalance policy China possessed a more robust 
aviation arsenal.85 Over the course of eleven years, PLAAF upgraded its B-6 bomber 
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fleet, developed several types of early-warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, 
and expanded its long-range advanced SAM systems.86 Additionally, in 2007 the PLAAF 
deployed many new aircraft, which possessed newer technology such as the F-10, which 
is multi-role operational aircraft.87 In 2007, the PLAAF started developing and deploying 
auxiliary combat aircraft in order to refuel, collect intelligence, or conduct other similar 
supporting roles.88 By January 2011, China already tested newer fighter aircrafts, which 
possessed upgraded technology and stealth characteristics.89 These significant 
developments over the past decade of PLAAF highlight China’s gradual modernization 
and expansion over their aviation forces. 
6. CHINA’S ENHANCED SPACE CAPABILITIES 
In addition to modernizing its naval, missile program, and air forces, China has 
also been improving its space capabilities. A notable advancement of Chinese military 
space capabilities took place on January 2007 when China successfully tested an anti-
satellite weapon (ASAT).90 The sole function of an ASAT is to strategically destroy 
space satellites. Why will this space advancement concern China’s neighbors? This 
ASAT test concerns Beijing’s neighbors because it casts a considerable amount of 
uneasiness since this test demonstrated to its regional neighbors and the United States its 
development of a military capability in space that involves destroying or disabling a 
satellite positioned in space. 91  
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Another notable increase in Chinese space capabilities involves their global 
positional navigational system, the Beidou. Over the past decade, China successfully 
established a regional navigation system after deploying three Beidou satellites between 
October 2000 and May 2003.92 By 2012, China had already deployed six Beidou 
navigation satellites and 11 new remote sensing civil and military applications.93 The six 
navigation satellites that were launched by 2012 helped China establish a complete 
navigational and positional network within the Asia-Pacific region.94 These six Beidou 
satellites are part of a larger plan that will allow China to have its own Global Positioning 
System (GPS), which will allow China to not become dependent on the United States’ 
Global Positioning System. Beijing plans to have its Beidou navigational satellite system 
to become operational by 2020.95 
The rise of China’s space program presents a threat to the United States primarily 
because these improvements in China’s space capabilities can potentially be used to 
enhance China’s weapons.96 For example, like the United States’ impressive offensive 
strikes during the first Persian Gulf War in 1990–1991, which were enabled by GPS, 
Chinese modernized armaments may later become aligned with their Beidou system in 
order to develop smart weapons, which will improve precision strikes against targets and 
further enhance China’s conventional military capabilities.97 
In sum, it is evident that Asia’s dragon has new teeth. China’s rapidly growing 
military capability is an ingredient that produces a great amount of concern about its true 
intentions and fostering insecurity throughout the region among China’s neighbors. 
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C. CHINA’S ASSERTIVENESS 
China’s large military buildup has certainly created a significant amount of 
distress among its regional neighbors, which has led many military analysts and leading 
scholars to believe that China is striving to become a Pacific hegemon.98 As I illustrated 
earlier in this chapter, China’s rapid military growth has given this regional dragon the 
necessary teeth to challenge the regional order. In this section, I am going to examine 
several regional incidents that demonstrate China’s growing assertiveness over the past 
decade. This section is going to emphasize China’s growing assertiveness in the region 
before 2011 that traces back to 1996. Furthermore, in the interest of reinforcing my 
argument, I am going to take a comparative analysis approach to these events of 
assertiveness and assess these cases before and after the rebalance policy was announced 
in 2011. 
1. CHINA’S ASSERTIVENESS BEFORE 2011 
Since 2000, China’s actions have been more forceful in nature within the Pacific 
region, mainly over its territorial disputes in the South China (SCS) and East China Sea 
(ECS). Furthermore, the evidence I will provide below will show how China’s 
assertiveness has been more frequent and aggressive since 2000 particularly in the SCS 
and ECS. 
What actions count as an assertive behavior? The several cases I will explain 
below are examples of Chinese assertiveness within the region since all these cases 
involved forceful and physical actions taken by China. How assertive was China ten 
years before 2000? A case that illustrates China’s menacing behavior before 2000 is the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis. From 1995-1996, China carried out a series of military exercises 
and military tests near Taiwan in the interest of intimidating the Taiwanese 
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government.99 In response to China’s threatening regional behavior, President Clinton 
deployed two aircraft carriers in in order to help stabilize the region.100 This example in 
1996 is a case of China’s assertiveness 10 years before 2000. 
In 2010, former Secretary of State Clinton stated, “resolving the territorial 
disputes off China’s southern coastline is a leading diplomatic priority.”101 Over the last 
decade, the international maritime dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands and reefs 
of the South China Sea between China, Philippines, and Vietnam has attracted a 
considerable amount of attention. This dispute is a result of China’s expansive claim and 
growing uses of force over these claims.102 
On March 23, 2001, a Chinese warship aggressively confronted the USNS 
Bowditch while carrying out her military survey duties near China’s claimed exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) in the Yellow Sea.103 After being confronted, the USNS Bowditch 
was ordered to depart the EEZ.104 This incident between the USNS Bowditch and the 
Chinese warship forced the U.S. embassy to file a written complaint with the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and redeploy the USNS Bowditch, but this time with an 
armed U.S. escort in order to continue her mission.105 Another piece of evidence that 
highlights China’s growing threatening behavior occurred on October 2006 when a 
Chinese submarine shadowed a U.S. aircraft carrier battle group in the Pacific Ocean and 
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surfaced within firing range.106 This incident highlights how threatening Chinese 
submarines have become to U.S. naval forces in the Pacific.107 According to a report 
from the Washington Times, the Chinese submarine approached the U.S. aircraft carrier 
and surfaced undetected within five miles.108 
Between 2005–2009, China demonstrated its growing use of force over its 
territorial claims in the South China Sea. First, the number of South Sea Region Fisheries 
Administration Bureau (SSRFAB) vessels increased from 477 to 1,235 between 2005 and 
2009.109 The SSRFAB is a Chinese law enforcement agency that was formed with the 
purpose of strengthening its ability to supervise fishing within the claimed waters. 
Second, in 2008 and 2009, SSRFAB vessels confronted and ejected 135 and 147 foreign 
vessels.110 Furthermore, some of these encounters were deadly and other confrontations 
resulted in China detaining Vietnamese fishing boats along with its crew.111 
In 2009 the SSRFAB arranged eleven special operations around the Paracel 
Islands, which lasted around twenty-five days in order to reinforce the Chinese presence 
around these claimed islands.112 On March 8, 2009, five Chinese vessels harassed the 
USNS Impeccable when she was carrying out her routine patrol in the South China 
Sea.113 Throughout this incident, the Chinese vessels closely and aggressively followed 
the USNS Impeccable and came within 50 feet of the vessel in order to wave her down 
and instruct the ship to depart the area.114 In response to this Chinese provocation, the 
crew onboard the USNS Impeccable sprayed its fire hoses at one of the vessels. This 
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incident, which occurred eight years after the USNS Bowditch event, helps demonstrate 
China’s growing assertiveness in the region.115 
On February 25, 2011, a Chinese frigate boldly fired three shots at a Philippine 
fishing vessel that was navigating near Jackson Atoll, which is located near the 
Philippines.116 In March 2011, two Chinese Marine Surveillance Force (MSF) vessels 
expelled a foreign vessel, which was carrying out her seismic surveying duties in a 
Philippine exploration block near Reed Bank by aggressively maneuvering around the 
foreign ship and forcing it to the depart the area.117 Moreover, the Philippine government 
has made several reports indicating that five similar incidents occurred in the Reed Bank 
before June 2011.118 In May 2011 a MSF vessel sailed across the stern of a Vietnamese 
seismic survey vessel and deliberately cutting the exploration cables of the Vietnamese 
seismic ship.119 Additionally, another assertive case occurred on early June 2011 when a 
Chinese vessel that possessed a specialized cable-slashing device became entangled in 
the towed cables of a Norwegian vessel that was carrying out her seismic surveying 
duties off the coast of southern Vietnam located in the southwestern portion of the South 
China Sea.120 Lastly, On July 5, 2011, another example of continued assertive behavior 
by China involved Chinese soldiers boarding a Vietnamese fishing vessel, which was 
operating near the Paracel Islands. According to a news report, this forceful boarding 
resulted in the Chinese soldiers punching and kicking the vessel’s captain and threating 
his crewmembers.121 
The territorial disputes that have been taking place in the East China Sea mainly 
involve Asia’s two largest powers, Japan and China. The discovery of petroleum reserves 
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in 1968 stimulated the question of ownership regarding the five islands known as Diaoyu 
in China and Senkaku in Japan, which were vacant at the time.122 Furthermore, this initial 
territorial dispute continued to unfold when China, Japan, and South Korea contracted 
firms in order to start drilling in the pursuit of oil because it augmented the uncertainty 
during this period.123 
For almost four decades sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East 
China Sea has remained unclear.124 Overall, China had threatened Japan regarding the 
sovereignty over these islands 26 times between 1978 and 2008.125 Although this 
territorial dispute goes back four decades, this dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
has become more common since 2000. This territorial dispute did not heighten and 
become more forceful until 2010 when a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two 
Japanese coast guard ships.126 This collision attracted the international community’s 
attention regarding the East China Sea territorial dispute mainly because past events were 
not physical in nature. Furthermore, U.S. state officials and scholars labeled this incident 
as a turning point in the affairs between Japan and China.127 After the collision, the 
Japanese arrested the fishing boat’s captain and attempted to put him on trial.128 
According to many scholars, the apprehension of the Chinese captain was viewed 
differently from China and Japan.129 China perceived the apprehension of their fishing 
boat captain as an act of aggression against China. In contrast to China’s perspective, 
Japan viewed this incident as an act of aggression against their country and suspected that 
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this colliding incident was part of a larger plan that involved the complete occupation of 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.130 
In sum, after examining the various assertive cases carried out by China between 
2000-2011, it is fair to say that China’s assertiveness has grown and their actions have 
become more aggressive over the recent years, particularly in the South and East China 
Sea. Between China’s military advancements, A2/AD strategies, and growing 
assertiveness one can conclude that these combined factors have contributed toward an 
instable region.  
2. CHINA’S ASSERTIVENESS AFTER 2011 
In this section I am going to examine China’s assertiveness since 2011 in the 
interest of examining how China’s sustained assertiveness has influenced the 
implementation of the rebalance in the Asia-Pacific. As I examined above, China’s 
actions have been more forceful and frequent since 2000 within the region, particularly 
over its territorial claims. Furthermore, these increased tensions due to China’s 
assertiveness encouraged the United States and eleven other participating countries 
during the July 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to publically express its concerns 
about China’s assertiveness).131 How assertive has China been since 2011? 
On March 3, 2012 China apprehended 21 Vietnamese fishermen, who were 
fishing near the Paracel Islands and detained them for seven weeks.132 Two months later, 
on April 2012, Chinese and Philippine ships were involved in another confrontation that 
was caused over territory near the Scarborough Shoal. This incident that took place over 
the Scarborough Shoal commenced when the Philippines deployed its warships to look 
into the sightings of Chinese fishing vessels, that in turn encouraged China to dispatch its 
Marine Surveillance vessels in order to prevent the apprehension of the Chinese 
fishermen.133 Even though there were multiple diplomatic attempts to defuse this 
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standoff situation, China ended assuming control over the Scarborough Shoal when its 
fisheries patrols raised a floating fence around this reef in order to block Philippine and 
fishing vessels from having access to the shoal.134 This dispute over the Scarborough 
Shoal illustrates China’s continued assertiveness in the South China Sea.135 
The dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands was exacerbated on September 11, 
2012, when Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda made a declaration to nationalize 
these disputed islands.136 According to Japanese reports, Noda’s statement was intended 
to prevent Governor Shintaro Ishihara from purchasing the islands and using them as a 
staging ground in order to carry out proactive actions.137 In contrast to Japan’s intention, 
China perceived Japan’s announcement as a confrontational declaration and as a way to 
demonstrate Japan’s method of taking control of these disputed islands. Furthermore, the 
Chinese actions that followed Japan’s statement were heavily aggressive in nature. For 
example, after this announcement China deployed more military vessels and aircraft into 
this disputed area therefore created an insecure region.138 On February 2013, Chinese 
military vessels aimed their fire-control radar against a Japanese ship and helicopter near 
the disputed islands in the East China Sea.139 
In addition to these examples of assertiveness that I have provided above, another 
example of China’s sustained menacing behavior is their declaration on November 2013 
of an extended East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).140 According to 
China’s proclamation regarding the ADIZ, Beijing stated that they would enforce the 
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rules pertaining to their ADIZ, which demands that any foreign aircraft flying through the 
ADIZ shall provide a flight plan.141 How intimidating was this Chinese statement 
regarding the ADIZ? This bold move by China’s government was perceived as an 
intimidating step, particularly by Japan, since the ADIZ included a significant portion of 
airspace over the disputed islands between China and Japan.142 According to a U.S. 
Security Review Report, Beijing stated that this new ADIZ was a necessary step in order 
to protect territorial and airspace security.143 This intimidating behavior carried out by 
China, illustrates their continuous assertiveness throughout the Pacific region, which in 
turn influences the implementation of the rebalance strategy to the Asia-Pacific. 
Another recent case of Chinese assertiveness, involved a U.S. warship and a 
Chinese amphibious ship. In December 2013, the USS Cowpens found herself 
aggressively maneuvering in order to avoid colliding with a Chinese warship.144 
According to reports, the USS Cowpens was safely navigating within international waters 
in the South China Sea when she was forced to boldly maneuver because of a Chinese 
amphibious ship that crossed the U.S. warship’s path at a close distance.145 According to 
Chinese officials, the PLA Navy was provoked by the belief that the USS Cowpens was 
monitoring activities of China’s new aircraft carrier, Liaoning.146 These actions taken by 
China’s naval forces are further cases that illustrate Beijing’s constant threatening 
behavior therefore helping to shape the implementation of the rebalancing strategy. 
In sum, although some of these incidents involved non-military Chinese ships, 
these cases that I provided above highlights China’s forcefulness within the region since 
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the announcement of the rebalance strategy. These assertive actions raise a significant 
amount of questions and concerns among its China’s regional neighbors and outside 
observers such as, what are China’s intentions? Does China seek to become a Pacific 
hegemon?147 According to analysts, China’s method for behaving assertively within the 
region and particularly toward its territorial disputes is characterized as a salami-slicing 
strategy.148 Furthermore, this salami-slicing strategy is associated with a series of bold 
tactics that will help China take control over disputed territories, and progressively 
change the status quo in Beijing’s favor.149 After examining and comparing China’s acts 
of assertiveness before the announcement of the rebalance strategy in 2011, and since 
2011, it is easy to see China’s growth and sustained assertive behavior. In the following 
section of this chapter, I am going to examine the U.S. military element of the rebalance 
strategy, and examine its importance in reassuring U.S. allies and partners in the region. 
D. U.S. MILITARY RESPONSES 
The military aspect of the rebalance strategy is a high profile and critical piece of 
the U.S. shift to the Pacific, which is aimed toward the reassurance of U.S. allies and 
partners within the region. According to a Congressional Research Service Report, the 
Obama’s administration’s increased efforts and change of policy on the Asia-Pacific 
region was encouraged by China’s growing military capabilities and increased 
assertiveness within the region.150  
As former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated, “U.S. rebalancing toward the 
Asia-Pacific represents an important change in U.S. defense strategy.”151 This shift in 
focus and strategy toward the Pacific is certainly a major change from previous strategies. 
In January 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) released a fresh defense 
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strategic guidance, which is titled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st 
Century Defense.” This strategic document underscores the justification for shifting the 
focus to the Asia-Pacific and highlights the primary missions of the U.S. military during 
this shift, which include deter and defeat aggression, project power despite A2/AD 
challenges, and provide a stabilizing presence within the Asia-Pacific.152 In order to 
successfully support these primary missions, the DOD will need to skillfully re-posture 
its global forces toward the Asia-Pacific without adversely impacting other regions 
throughout the world. In the interest of developing my argument, which is centered on 
strategically reassuring U.S. allies and friends, how far the United States has gone toward 
implementing its military element of the rebalance strategy? 
According to U.S. defense civilian leadership and senior military leaders, the 
military purpose of the rebalance strategy is characterized into three parts, which are a 
broader distribution of forces, increased flexibility, and enhancing partner’s capacities.153 
First, increasing the U.S. military presence within the region allows the United States to 
have its forces more broadly distributed, which in turn strengthens the defense posture 
within the Asia-Pacific.154 Moreover, it is mutually beneficial for the United States and 
for the states within the Asia-Pacific to increase the U.S. military presence within the 
region since this defense posture will enable the United States to adopt a more adjustable 
model.155 Second, this shift of emphasis on the military allows U.S. forces to take on a 
more flexible approach to deployments toward the Pacific region.156 Furthermore, U.S. 
defense officials characterize the military element of the rebalance strategy as a more 
accommodating approach since future U.S. deployments will be smaller and more 
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agile.157 Third, this shift allows the United States to strengthen its military ties with its 
regional allies and partners.158 
In 2011, the United States pledged to take a variety of steps in order to help shift 
its military resources towards the Pacific.159 As part of the U.S. strategic shift toward the 
Asia-Pacific, the United States announced new troop deployments to Australia, new 
naval deployments to Singapore and the Philippines.160 Furthermore, another 
announcement that was made in 2013 was the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from 
Okinawa to Guam and Hawaii, and transforming them into four Marine Air Ground Task 
Forces (MAGTFs).161 Another major piece that was announced in 2012 by former 
Secretary of the Navy Leon Panetta was the reorganization of U.S. naval forces into the 
Asia-Pacific.162 According to Panetta, by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. naval fleet will be 
based in the Pacific region.163 
1. AIR-SEA BATTLE STRATEGY 
In September 2009, U.S. Air Force chief of staff and the U.S. Navy chief of naval 
operations signed a document that gave birth to the Air-Sea Battle operational concept. 
The ASB operational concept is intended to integrate air force and navy assets to swiftly 
and efficiently carry out operations in the Western Pacific Theater of Operations 
(WPTO), and within other theaters of operation.164 Although the ASB operational 
concept did not emerge until 2009, this joint operational theory was found to be effective 
in addressing the distinctive challenges, which were presented in the Asia-Pacific, such as 
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the emerging anti-access and ant-denial capabilities within the region.165 According to 
the current Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert, “there is good 
strategic, operational, and tactical value in the ASB operational concept.”166 Moreover, 
this joint operational model addresses the emerging A2/AD capabilities, which presents a 
threat to U.S. forces in the near future and risk the successful execution of the U.S. 
rebalance strategy.  
In the interest of developing my argument, which is centered on strategically 
reassuring U.S. allies and friends because of China’s military growth and assertiveness, 
how far the United States has gone toward implementing its military element of the 
rebalance strategy? After describing what military steps the United States pledged to take 
toward the Asia-Pacific and examining the Air-Sea Battle operational concept’s relevance 
to the rebalance, in the following sub-sections I am going to describe the steps that have 
been implemented in support of the rebalance strategy. In order to clearly address these 
steps, I will separate and describe them according to their associated military service. 
Furthermore, I am going to address these steps based on their level of importance to the 
U.S. rebalance strategy. 
2. U.S. NAVY 
The close involvement of the U.S. Navy in the rebalance strategy is an important 
piece of this shift in policy that was driven by regional security concerns which is why I 
will start addressing the U.S. Navy’s steps. What is the U.S. Navy’s overall role in the 
rebalance strategy? According to Panetta’s strategic guidance, which was given in 2012, 
the Navy’s ultimate goal is to have 60 percent of its naval assets based in the Pacific by 
2020.167 The navy’s shift of its overall surface combatants started taking its shape on 
February 11, 2014, when the USS Donald Cook started her forward deployment 
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operations in the area of the sixth fleet.168 According to the Commander of Naval Surface 
Forces, the USS Ross left its homeport in Norfolk on June 3, 2014 in order to make her 
transit to Rota, Spain.169 The USS Ross will be the second of four guided-missile 
destroyers to be forward deployed in Spain.170 
These homeport shifts of U.S. destroyers to Rota, Spain are part of a larger plan of 
increasing the naval presence in the Pacific. According to Panetta’s guidance, 
permanently stationing four destroyers in Rota, Spain, in order to provide ballistic missile 
support to the U.S. European allies is a way to rotate six destroyers from the Atlantic and 
assigned them to the Asia-Pacific, which will strengthen the security in the Asia-Pacific 
and reassure its allies and partners against an assertive China.171 
The repositioning of a fourth attack submarine, which will be based in Guam, is 
another implemented step forward toward the strategic reshaping in the Asia-Pacific in 
the interest of reassurance.172 According to navy’s leadership, the USS Topeka will be the 
planned addition to Guam’s strategic hub, which in turn will augment the navy’s presence 
in the region.173 Another step toward the implementation of the rebalance strategy is USS 
Freedom’s (LCS-1) first rotational deployment to Southeast Asia in March 1, 2013.174 
This first rotational deployment is another example of how actions are matching words, 
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since in the fall of 2011 the United States stated that one of its steps was to launch new 
rotational deployments to Singapore.175 
Since the announcement of this strategic shift toward the Pacific other naval 
assets have been repositioned to the Pacific Command’s (PACOM) area of responsibility. 
For example, EP-3 signal reconnaissance aircrafts have been repositioned from Central 
Command (CENTCOM) to PACOM as military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan come 
to an end. In addition, Navy P-3s, which served as maritime patrol aircraft in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, were placed back to PACOM since the drawdown of forces in Iraq.176 
The increased naval presence in the U.S. Pacific is important for assuring 
allies/partners against an assertive China because it will help in strengthening Asia’s 
security environment and increases the ability for the United States to project power in 
the region.177 Furthermore, the naval component of the U.S. rebalancing strategy is 
welcomed by many countries in the Pacific. For example, the United States and 
Singapore signed an agreement that will eventually permit four littoral combat ships 
(LCSs) to be forward deployed in Singapore, which the first of the LCS ships recently 
completed her maiden deployment.178 Another example of the welcoming of the 
increased naval presence in the Pacific is the signing of a ten-year agreement, which 
occurred on April 2014 between the United States and the Philippines.179 Moreover, this 
agreement will allow naval forces to have a greater access to bases across the Philippines 
and thus will help reinforce the navy’s presence within the region. The increased U.S. 
presence in the region will not only enhance the region’s security, but will also aid in 
                                                 
175 Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? 1. 
176 Carter, “Deputy Secretary of Defense.” 
177 Ibid., 2. 
178 Molly Evans, “USS Freedom Completes Maiden Deployment; Returns to San Diego,” United 
States Navy, December 23, 2013, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=78445; Jonathan 
Greenert, “Sea Change: The Navy Pivots to Asia, Foreign Policy, November 14, 2012, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/14/sea_change. 
179 Jim Gomez, “U.S. Philippines Reach Deal on Military Accord,” Navy Times, April 27, 2014, 
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20140427/NEWS05/304270012. 
 35 
reassuring the Filipino government against an assertive China over territorial claims in 
the South China Sea.180 
3. MARINE CORPS 
Although the U.S. Marine Corps transitioned out of Iraq and Afghanistan they 
also have a critical role in this shift of fundamental policy toward the Asia-Pacific. What 
is the marines overall role in the U.S. rebalance strategy? According to U.S. defense 
officials, since the announcement of this strategy, the Marine Corps will establish a 2,500 
marine rotational force in Darwin, Australia.181 In April 2012, approximately seven 
months after Obama’s “Pivot to the Pacific” statement, 200 marines arrived in Darwin, 
Australia.182 A second rotation of approximately 250 marines arrived in April 2013.183 
Additionally, in April 2014, the third rotational marine deployment to Darwin was carried 
out, which included a rotational force of 1,150 marines.184 This rotational force in 
Australia is in accordance with the strategic guidance that was offered in 2012 by the 
Obama administration, which stressed the steady drive to increase the military presence 
in the Pacific. Establishing a rotational presence of marines in Darwin helps reinforce the 
preservation of peace and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region, mainly because 
this rotational presence will enhance the ability of U.S. and Australian forces to rapidly 
deploy in order to meet regional challenges such as general security conditions, 
humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief situations.185 Another strategic value this 
rotational presence provides the United States is its enhancement of security cooperation 
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particularly with countries in Southeast Asia, which over the past decade has assumed a 
greater importance in U.S. strategic thinking.186 
The Australian perspective toward the U.S. rebalancing to Asia strategy is 
generally favorable. According to a poll taken back in 2012, 87 percent of Australians 
support the United States’ rebalance toward Asia and agree that the U.S.-Australian 
alliance is important for Australia’s security.187 Australia’s strong support toward the 
rebalancing strategy is essential in order to increase the U.S. military presence in the 
region will contribute toward the reassurance of allies and partners within the region. 
4. AIR FORCE 
The air force’s role in this strategy is to assign space, tactical aircraft, and bomber 
forces to the Asia-Pacific.188 The overall objective for shifting air force resources into the 
Pacific region is to be able to deliver speed, surveillance, reconnaissance, and swift 
power projection within the Asia-Pacific region in the event  they are needed to meet 
security threats.189 According to the 2014 Federal Budget Fact Sheet for the Asia-Pacific, 
$70 million dollars has been committed in order to carry out rotational deployments of 
U.S. air force units onto Australia, in the interest of increasing air-superiority within the 
Pacific region.190 Moreover, these funds will be used to support military exercises and 
training between the air force and other allies and partners throughout the Asia-Pacific 
region.191 Another key air force contribution toward this shift in strategy is the 
augmentation in the air force’s B-52s to the region, since military operations in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan are drawing down.192 Increasing the U.S. air force power in the Pacific is 
important to the rebalance strategy since it further demonstrates the U.S. intentions on 
increasing its military presence in the Pacific in the interest of implementing the 
rebalance strategy.193 
5. ARMY 
Another American ground force that was deeply engaged with the conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan also plays an important part in this rebalance strategy. The U.S. Army’s 
long-term objective is increasing its presence within the Pacific, by shifting its resources 
from other regions to the Pacific. The army has roughly 88,000 soldiers and civilians who 
are forward deployed in the Asia-Pacific region currently supporting the PACOM 
commander.194 Furthermore, as army forces continue to draw down in the Middle East 
more troops will be available for rotations to the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, these rotational 
deployments will be mainly carried out by regiment battalions, which possess around 800 
troops, in support of the rebalance strategy in the Asia-Pacific.195 The army’s increased 
presence is important to assuring U.S. allies and partners, primary because this shift of 
army’s resources to the Pacific will help strengthen the regional security environment, 
and solidify the U.S. commitment towards the Asia-Pacific.196 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the changes in the U.S. military posture support the U.S. rebalance 
strategy to the Asia Pacific. Even though Beijing states that its rise is peaceful, I argued 
in this chapter that the United States adopted this change of policy in response to China’s 
growth in military capabilities and increasingly threatening behavior within the region in 
order to strategically reassure its regional allies and partners. In this chapter, I first 
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presented evidence on China’s expansion in their defense budget and military capabilities 
and demonstrated how this has enabled their threatening behavior. Moreover, with this 
evidence regarding China’s assertiveness I illustrated how China’s behavior has become 
more forceful within the region since 2000, particularly in the South and East China Sea. 
Furthermore, in the interest of demonstrating the U.S. intentions toward the U.S.’s 
rebalancing to the Pacific strategy, I gathered and presented the steps that the United 
States has taken in order to meet its strategic proposals since its announcement in 2011. 




III. ECONOMIC REASONS FOR THE REBALANCE TO THE 
PACIFIC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the words of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Our economic 
recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the 
vast and growing consumer base of Asia.”197 This statement, which was delivered in 
Clinton’s 2011 Foreign Policy article, underscored the importance for the United States 
to take advantage of Asia’s economic growth and vast investment opportunities. The 
2008 financial crisis had a significant effect on the United States, which led to the loss of 
millions of U.S. jobs that in turn adversely affected the U.S. economy. Deepening 
working relationships, engaging with Asia’s multilateral institutions, and expanding trade 
and investments are a few key initiatives that were announced in 2011 to help strengthen 
its economy.198 Although one main reason for this rebalance strategy was to strategically 
reassure U.S. allies and partners against an assertive China, I will argue in this chapter 
that another motive for the rebalance strategy was to take advantage of Asia’s economic 
growth. In this chapter, I will first examine certain consequences of the 2008 financial 
crisis, and analyze how its ramifications weakened the U.S. economy. Second, I will 
assess in this chapter the reasoning behind shifting toward the Pacific and not Europe. 
Third, I will show that although Asia’s economy was impacted by the 2008 financial 
crisis, the effects were less severe compared to the United States and Europe. In addition, 
I will examine various indicators of Asia’s economic importance and its relevance to the 
rebalance strategy. Fourth, I will examine some of the U.S. key economic responses to 
the financial crisis, including the National Export Initiative, strengthening regional 
relationships, and efforts in finalizing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and explain how 
these responses are related to the rebalancing strategy. 
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B. THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS: IMPACTS ON THE UNITED 
STATES, EUROPE, AND ASIA 
The 2008 financial crisis was an economic disaster that had an adverse impact on 
the U.S. economy. The chain of events that started with the bursting of the U.S. housing 
market bubble triggered the 2008 financial crisis.199 In October 2008, the flow of credit 
was restricted to consumers and businesses, consumer confidence dropped, and in turn, 
economies throughout the globe fell into economic recession.200 By the end of 2008, the 
total amount of job losses was estimated to be about 2.6 million; these job losses marked 
the highest level in the United States in more than six decades.201 Moreover, this great 
loss of American jobs had a significant impact on the U.S. unemployment rate. In 2007, 
unemployment in the United States was at 5.0 percent and by the end of 2009 the 
unemployment had sharply increased to a 9.5 percent.202 
In addition to its social and economic impact, the 2008 financial crisis also 
created security issues. According to former director of National Intelligence Dennis 
Blair, “instability in countries around the globe caused by the global economic crisis, 
rather than terrorism is a key near-term security threat to the United States.”203 These 
words emphasized the impact of the financial crisis on national security. 
The financial crisis had a negative impact on the U.S. economy, but its effects 
were also visible in Europe. The decline of various European economies ignited another 
economic disaster in Europe, which is often referred to as the Eurozone crisis.204 
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Europe’s economic crisis triggered three distinct catastrophes—banking, sovereign debt, 
and growth crises—that furthered weakened the economy.205 First, Europe’s banks were 
undercapitalized and faced a liquidity issue, which in turn caused consumers to lose faith 
in their banking institutions and withdraw their money. Second, the sovereign debt crisis 
caused multiple countries in Europe to face high bond yields, making it difficult for some 
governments to repay its borrowers.206 Third, the slowdown in Europe’s economic 
growth was another key reason why the United States did not look toward Europe in 
2011 to help strengthen its economy. These problems made Europe’s economy 
unattractive to the United States because of its adverse impact on U.S. exports and its 
inability to create American jobs.207 
1. ASIA’S ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE 
Although Asian economies were affected by the 2008 financial crisis, its effects 
on them were less severe compared to the United States and Europe. In 2008, the total 
bankruptcies in the United States rose to 1,117,771 from the 850,912 in 2007.208 In 
contrast to the United States, after the first months of the financial crisis Asian states did 
not face this large amount of bankruptcies or have to bail out big domestic financial 
institutions.209 According to a Congressional Research Service Report, many nations 
particularly those in East Asia, ended with current account surpluses, which significantly 
contributed toward the buildup of a large amount of government reserves within the Asia-
Pacific region.210 The benefit for Asia having a large amount of government reserves at 
the beginning of the crisis was that these reserves helped Asian economies to 
immediately deliver fiscal stimulus packages, inject capital into their financial systems, 
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and offer guarantees for private financial exchanges.211 Although in Asia the growth of 
GDP declined at the outset of the crisis, its economic recovery was more rapid compared 
to the U.S. and Europe. This rebound was a result of the immediate support of fiscal and 
monetary policies that was injected into its economy.212 
Asian economies became a higher priority in U.S. foreign policy after the 2008 
financial crisis for three main reasons.213 First, Asia’s economic importance involved a 
variety of factors, which included Asia’s large population, its significant growth in 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematical education in many Asian states.214 
This growth in education allows for increased economic opportunities in the future in 
Asia. Second, some of the fastest emerging economies were also found in Asia.215 Third, 
benefiting from trade was another key motive for placing Asia’s economy as a priority in 
U.S. foreign policy. 
Before the United States adopted the rebalance strategy in 2011 Asia’s economy 
was already showing signs of growth. According to a regional economic report by the 
International Monetary Fund, Asia’s share of global exports and imports doubled 
between 1980 and 2010.216 Even though Asian economies were impacted by the financial 
crisis, Asian economies showed growth 1.5 years after the start of the crisis. The Asia-
Pacific region sustained a positive growth from 5.7 percent in 2008 to 7.6 percent in 
2009.217 In contrast to the economic growth rate in the U.S., which grew at 2.9% in 2010, 
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Asia’s rapid economic growth reached an impressive 8.3 percent in 2010.218 In 2011, 
Asia’s economic growth rate averaged about 7 percent, which was greatly assisted by 
China and India’s economies because of their expansion by 9 percent.219 
U.S. exports to Asia have increased since 2009. In order to illustrate this growth 
of U.S. exports to Asia, I will use Asia’s five largest economies since 2011, which were 
China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia. According to the United States Census 
Bureau, from 2009 to 2011, U.S. exports to these five large economies increased 220 (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1.  U.S. exports to Asia. All figures are in millions of U.S. 
dollars.221 
Asian Economies 2009 2010 2011 
China 296, 373.9 364,952.6 399,371.2 
Japan 95,803.7 120,552.1 128,927.9 
India 21,166.0 29,532.9 36,154.5 
South Korea 39,215.6 48,875.2 56,661.4 
Indonesia 12,938.6 16,475.3 19,110.9 
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This rise of U.S. exports to Asia demonstrates how Asia’s export markets were 
becoming important to the Obama administration in order to boost the U.S. economic 
growth and support the creation of millions of American jobs. In 2010, China was ranked 
the world’s second largest economy with a GDP of about $5.9 trillion and Japan was 
ranked number three with a GDP of about $5.5 trillion.222 India was ranked the world’s 
tenth largest economy with $1.9 trillions of dollars in GDP.223 Additionally in 2010, 
eight of the 20 fastest growing economies in the world were found in the Asia-Pacific.224 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) from the Asia-Pacific region into the United 
States also played a critical role in strengthening of the U.S. economy. The United States 
benefited immensely from Asian-Pacific FDI because of the creation of millions of 
American jobs. In 2008, Asian-Pacific FDI accounted for 16 percent of the total FDI 
positon in the U.S. economy, which was $310 billion.225 The remainder of the 71 percent 
of FDI in the United States was dominated by Europe.226 In 2008, Japanese companies 
invested a total $35.7 billion in the United States. Australian companies trailed Japan’s 
FDI with $15.6 billion, India with $1.7 billion and Singapore with $1.4 billion.227 By 
2012, the amount of Asian-Pacific FDI into the United States increased to 31 percent.228 
This 15 percent increase from 2008 to 2012 has contributed toward the employment of 
thousands of Americans, which in turn has played an important role in U.S. economic 
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growth. After examining some historical economic data before 2011, it is fair to say that 
Asia’s economic growth offered vast economic opportunities to the United States. 
After Clinton’s article in 2011, Asia’s economy continued to show signs of 
growth. According to the IMF’s regional report, Asia showed a 6.75 percent economic 
growth in 2012.229 The IMF released a regional report in 2014 that showed Asia’s steady 
economic growth throughout 2014 and projected Asia’s economic development to remain 
solid at 5.5 percent in 2015.230 As Asia’s economy continues to grow, its region’s 
economic outlook will be of great importance to the United States simply because 
America’s economic recovery depends on it. 
In sum, the 2008 financial crisis had a damaging impact on the U.S. economy and 
on numerous economies throughout the world. After the financial crisis, it was evident 
that although Asia suffered some blows by the crisis, its recovery and growth was rapid 
and robust. Clinton’s article in 2011 placed a great emphasis on reconnecting 
economically with the Asia-Pacific. The next section addresses key vehicles that the 
Obama administration announced in 2011 in order to re-engage economically with the 
Asia-Pacific and take advantage of its economic prosperity. 
2. U.S. RESPONSES 
The economic purpose of the rebalance is to take advantage of Asia’s prosperity 
and fuel the American economic recovery.231 Deepening working relationships with 
regional partners, engaging in multilateral Asian institutions, and expanding trade and 
investment throughout the Pacific are some key lines of action, which were proposed by 
former Secretary of State Clinton in order to reengage economically with the Asia-
Pacific.232 In the interest of strengthening the U.S. economic recovery, the Obama 
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administration has increased its efforts on economic and trade relations in the Asia-
Pacific.233 In the words of Kurt Campbell, former Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific affairs, “To benefit from this shift in global geopolitical dynamism and 
sustainably grow its economy, the United States is building extensive diplomatic, 
economic, development, people-to-people and security ties within the Asia-Pacific 
region.”234 This statement highlights the strategic value behind building relationships 
within the Pacific region in the interest of improving the U.S. economy. Former Secretary 
of State Clinton and other U.S. officials from the Obama administration have worked 
closely and effectively together with the support of U.S. agencies and departments to 
realize Obama’s rebalancing strategy.235 The Obama administration has defined the 
economic element of the rebalancing strategy as one main reason toward this shift in 
policy.236 
In testimony on U.S. economic relations before the U.S. Senate, U.S. Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Scot Marciel 
stated, “America’s future prosperity and security [are] very much intertwined with the 
prosperity and security of the East Asia-Pacific region.”237 The contents of this economic 
element of the rebalance strategy are broken into three main parts, which are increasing 
U.S. exports, deepening regional relationships, and benefiting from a regional Free Trade 
Agreement. The following sections will address these three parts of the economic 
element.  
a. Obama’s National Export Initiative 
The National Export Initiative (NEI) was an executive order, which was delivered 
by President Obama in March 2010 that was grounded on the idea of stimulating 
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economic growth in the United States.238 The NEI is part of the rebalancing strategy in 
an abstract way because targeting and reconnecting with Asian export markets will help 
support Obama’s vision of doubling U.S. exports and creating millions of American jobs. 
This growth of American jobs will help accelerate the recovery of the U.S. economy. 
What is the overall goal of the NEI? According to Obama’s executive order, the goal of 
the NEI is to double U.S. exports over a scope of five years, and reengaging with Asia’s 
export markets will help accelerate to achieve this goal.239  
In the words of President Obama, “The Asia-Pacific region with its tremendous 
economic growth and its large and growing middle class is a key market for U.S. 
exports.”240 His administration has made it a top priority to enhance the circumstances 
that affect American companies’ ability to export.241 The Asia-Pacific region played a 
critical role in Obama’s NEI because four of the ten emerging export markets targeted in 
the 2011 National Export Strategy are part of the Asia-Pacific.242, These four emerging 
export markets were China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.243 Asia has become the 
second-largest export market after North America since 2000; Asia’s economic 
importance has played an important role in the success of Obama’s NEI.244 The 
strengthening of the U.S. economy since the 2008 financial crisis has been a key 
objective for the Obama administration. 
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b. Deepening Relationships with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
The first piece of the deepening relationships element involves the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation. APEC possesses 21 members and is designed to facilitate the 
promotion of trade and investment by providing a setting that allows participating 
countries to focus on economic prosperity. Furthermore, APEC’s forums are heavily 
focused on advancing economic integration and trade relationships across the Asia-
Pacific. The goal of deepening relations with APEC is to strengthen existing regional 
U.S. alliances and partnerships, and build new relationships. Moreover, this is important 
because these relationships will in turn help protect and advance U.S. economic interests 
within the region. Since Asia’s economic rise, the United States has ramped up its efforts 
to engage with regional multilateral institutions. In the words of Clinton, “APEC and its 
work help expand U.S. exports and create and support high-quality jobs in the United 
States, while fostering growth throughout the region.”245 These words underscored the 
significance of APEC and its relevance to the rebalancing toward the Pacific region.  
According to a report from the U.S. Department of State, APEC economies are 
identified as the world’s most dynamic economic system because the Asia-Pacific region 
possesses approximately three billion consumers and is responsible for 44 percent of the 
world’s trade.246 In addition to its robust economies another beneficial feature that APEC 
provides the United States is its wide range of intellectual leadership. Furthermore, the 
United States finds APEC’s leadership to be helpful primarily because of the variety of 
new ideas and solutions that its APEC’s leadership helps to create that in turn will 
prevent regional trade barriers from rising.247 Strengthening relations with APEC is a 
U.S. initiative, which will assist the United States to drive and promote its U.S. exports to 
the Pacific region. 
                                                 
245 Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.” 




In the November 2009 APEC meeting in Singapore, President Obama took the 
opportunity to present his vision for U.S. policy in Asia.248 During that meeting that 
Obama announced his decision to enter into negotiations with the participating members 
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.249 Although there were many similar aspects of U.S. 
trade policy in Asia from previous administrations, the Obama administration has taken a 
more focused approach toward Asia since the financial crisis.250 
In November 2011, the United States hosted the APEC meetings in Honolulu. 
Some key topics of discussion were economic growth and the cooperation on trade 
regulations.251 In contrast to past U.S. presidents, who focused on improving relations 
with China, Obama has been focusing on connecting diplomatically and economically 
with the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Although president Obama did not attend the 
2012 APEC meeting in Russia, U.S. officials still addressed some key issues that 
involved the reduction of trade barriers, improvement of trade facilitation, and the 
establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) in the interest of staying 
economically engaged with the Pacific region.252 
c. Deepening Relations with the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations 
The second piece of the deepening relationships element involves the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations. Because the Obama administration recognized that a strong 
and integrated ASEAN is fundamentally in the U.S. national interest, in June 2010 the 
United States became first non-member to open a permanent mission to this multilateral 
institution.253 The United States has taken this approach in order to increase its 
engagement and interaction with the Asia-Pacific and strengthen its relations with 
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ASEAN. Deepening the U.S. and ASEAN connection is a diplomatic action that will help 
the United States advance and promote its economic interests throughout the Asia-Pacific 
region. ASEAN serves as another key channel to increase U.S. exports in Asia mainly 
because of its influential role on the region.254 
Although the United States has been connected with ASEAN as a dialogue 
partner since 1977, Obama increased his efforts and intensified its relations with ASEAN 
as soon he took office. For example, in 2012, President Obama attended four ASEAN-
U.S. leaders meetings in order to reinforce relations between the United States and 
ASEAN, and also in 2012 former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited 10 ASEAN 
countries in the interest of strengthening relationships and promoting U.S. economic 
interests.255 Promoting economic relationships, expanding U.S. trade in the Asia-Pacific, 
elevating economic cooperation with ASEAN and increasing opportunities for American 
businesses within the Pacific region were some key areas of discussion throughout these 
ASEAN-US meetings.256 
d. Deepening relations in the East Asia Summit 
The third piece of the deepening relationships element that I will address involves 
the East Asia Summit. The EAS encompasses 18 countries, of which ten are from 
ASEAN countries and eight members include United States, China, India, Japan, New 
Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and Russia.257 The importance of solidifying 
relationships within the EAS is grounded on the fact that this meeting reflects 56 percent 
of the world’s gross domestic product.258 A key factor that motivated president Obama to 
attend the EAS in November 2011 was his drive to express his commitment toward the 
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Asia-Pacific, strengthen existing partnerships, and build new ones.259 President Obama 
was the first American president to attend this conference in 2011.260 Some of the topics 
he focused on during this conference were the opening of Asian markets to American 
exports and announcing business deals worth at least $25 billion between American and 
companies within the Pacific region.261 These topics that Obama focused on during the 
EAS in 2011 were aimed toward the support of 127,000 American jobs, which will 
contribute to his larger goal of strengthening the U.S. economy. 262 In the words of 
Hillary Clinton, “Increasingly, economic progress depends on strong diplomatic progress, 
and diplomatic progress depends on strong economic ties. And naturally, a focus on 
promoting American prosperity means a greater focus on trade and economic openness in 
the Asia-Pacific.”263 This statement, showed the importance behind America’s pursuit 
toward strengthening its regional relationships and constructing new ones in the interest 
of reengaging with the Pacific region and helping the recovery of the U.S. economy.  
e. Trans-Pacific Partnership 
The last economic element I will examine is the U.S. involvement with a 
Regional Free Trade Agreement through finalizing negotiations in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. The TPP is part of the economic element of the rebalancing strategy because 
it is designed to strengthen the U.S. economy by increasing U.S. exports to Asia and 
supporting the creation of millions of American jobs. What is the overall goal of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership? The TPP is a prospective free-trade agreement among 12 
countries that seeks to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in imports, exports, 
services, and agriculture.264 In addition to the elimination of tariffs and non-tariffs this 
agreement also establishes some governing rules, which will address a comprehensive 
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scope of issues. The objective of the TPP when its original four members established its 
creation was to construct an ideal free-trade agreement that could be enlarged to include 
additional members from both sides of the Pacific.265 Unlike other Asia-Pacific free trade 
agreements, the TPP possesses a unique characteristic that allows other parties to join in 
the future, which ultimately makes this trading arrangement valuable because of its 
potential of expansion and economic growth. Although in 2008 there were efforts to join 
the TPP agreement, the Bush administration decided to deal with domestic economic 
issues rather than pursuing negotiations. In contrast to the Bush administration, President 
Obama wanted to pursue efforts toward joining the TPP in the interest of taking 
advantage of Asia’s economic growth. 
The TPP benefits the United States in three ways. First, this regional economic 
arrangement specifically targets the economic cooperation of four different regions in the 
Asia-Pacific.266 Secondly, the close engagement with this agreement demonstrates to 
regional leaders that the United States has not abandoned the Asia-Pacific and is still 
committed to remain as a Pacific power. Third, the success of this agreement will greatly 
benefit the rebalance strategy by grouping various robust and emerging economies under 
one agreement, which in turn will accelerate the economic recovery of the United States. 
The TPP possesses a considerable amount of strategic importance behind its 
implementation. The entrance into the TPP and its finalization will allow the United 
States to use the TPP as a strategic anchor within the Asia-Pacific region, which in turn 
will bring together and hold a variety of key relationships within the region in place. 
According to a report from the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States 
Senate, the TPP is the economic basis of the rebalance strategy, which will significantly 
help the Obama administration, meet its NEI objectives of doubling U.S. exports.267 
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266 Ann Capling and John Ravenhill, “Mutilateralising Regionalism: What Role for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement?” The Pacific Review (December 2011), 558, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.634078. 
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C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, another key motive for the Obama administration in adopting the 
rebalance strategy in 2011 was to support the recovery of the U.S. economy. In this 
chapter, I first examined certain adverse ramifications of the 2008 financial crisis, and 
analyzed how its effects weakened the U.S. economy. Another aspect I assessed in this 
chapter was the reasoning for shifting toward the Pacific and not Europe in the interest of 
improving the U.S. economy. In this chapter, I examined various indicators of Asia’s 
economic importance. After presenting the analytical framework for this chapter, I then 
developed my argument by describing and assessing those U.S. economic responses that 
fall under the rebalancing strategy’s economic element. This economic element includes 
a range of initiatives that are all intended to take advantage of Asia’s economic 
importance and improve the U.S. economy. Close U.S. economic and diplomatic 








After examining the evidence regarding China’s military growth and increasingly 
threatening behavior within the Pacific region over the past decade, I conclude that one 
fundamental reason the United States decided in 2011 to shift to the Asia-Pacific was to 
strategically reassure U.S. allies partners against an assertive China. In addition, after 
examining the evidence on Asia’s economic growth over the past decade, I have also 
come to the conclusion that another fundamental reason was to take advantage of Asia’s 
economic growth. The motivation behind the economic aspect was to help accelerate the 
recovery of the U.S. economy. The evidence that I have found for each one of my 
hypotheses was about equal.  
With this announced shift of U.S. policy in 2011 toward the Asia-Pacific, the 
question to ask is, what are the implications for the evidence that I have found? As 
described in Chapter I, three explanations for the importance of my findings are likely. 
First, the two key reasons that caused this shift in U.S. policy were mainly military and 
economic in nature. Second, the conditions under which the policy was announced in 
2011 have changed so this shift in strategy may be unsustainable. Third, the U.S. policy 
in rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific will potentially have broad international effects. In the 
following sections, I will assess the importance of the findings for the three explanations 
I provided above. 
A. CAUSES: MILITARY/ECONOMIC 
The evidence that I gathered to examine the military aspect of the rebalance 
strategy included a thorough assessment of China’s military growth and growing 
assertiveness within the region over the past decade. The implications of the evidence I 
have found regarding this military motive for the rebalance policy are centered on 
reassuring regional allies and partners against a threatening China. 
The evidence that was collected to assess the economic aspect of the rebalance 
policy included data to illustrate Asia’s economic growth over the past decade and its 
importance to the United States for strengthening its economy. The implications of the 
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evidence concerning this economic motive for this shift in policy are grounded on 
enhancing the recovery of the U.S. economy.  
B. PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE CONDITIONS AND THE 
UNSUSTAINABILITY OF THE REBALANCE POLICY 
When the pivot to the Asia-Pacific was announced in 2011, this strategy was 
closely associated with two former members of the Obama administration, Hillary 
Clinton and Robert Gates. At the time of its announcement, the rebalance strategy was 
widely broadcast with a series of high profile presidential and other executive level 
speeches, announcements, and articles that in turn captivated the attention of U.S. allies 
and partners particularly within the Pacific region.268 The conditions, under which this 
policy was announced in 2011, were the circumstances that I examined in chapter II and 
III in this thesis.  
 Although there have been new global security challenges and changes in key 
cabinet positions under the Obama administration since the adoption of this policy, 
Obama seems committed in achieving his vision to rebalance toward the Pacific. In the 
words of Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, “The United States also has a key role to 
play in this endeavor. As a leading economic and military power in the Pacific – one with 
no disputed territorial claims or ambitions in the region—the United States is uniquely 
positioned to continue to help Asian nations build a vibrant regional security 
architecture.” 269 This statement delivered by Hagel underscores the continued U.S. 
strength and commitment in strategically shifting toward the Asia-Pacific.  
The future implementation and stability of the rebalance strategy in the Asia-
Pacific is heavily dependent upon the leadership and active interaction of the United 
States with the Asia-Pacific. As the conditions under this rebalance policy continues to 
change or even be unsustainable, it is important for U.S. officials under the future 
administration to exercise all tools of foreign policy in order to influence and shape the 
future of the Pacific region. 
                                                 
268 Tsai, Obama’s Second Term, 15. 
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C. BROAD INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS  
 The implementation of this rebalance policy toward the Asia-Pacific will likely 
have broad international effects. First, increasing the presence of U.S. forces toward the 
Asia-Pacific will strengthen the region’s security. Second, this restructuring of U.S. 
forces will help enhance maximum responsiveness and a capable force in the Asia-Pacific 
in order to address imminent regional and global threats.270 In addition, establishing a 
capable U.S. force in the Pacific will likely increase tensions between China and the 
United States if both countries continue to follow the current path of adversity. Third, the 
U.S. efforts to reengage economically and diplomatically with the Asia-Pacific will also 
have broad international effects since the strengthening and building 
alliances/partnerships will reshape the order throughout the international community. 
This thesis outlined two central reasons for adopting the rebalance strategy in 
2011. The three explanations I have provided for the importance of my findings may be 
used in the future to help regional U.S. officials further understand the importance for 
shifting toward the Asia-Pacific. 
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